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Abstract. Murdoch and Levinas both believe that our humanity requires us to suppress 
our natural egoism and to be morally responsive to others. Murdoch insists that while 
such a morality presupposes a ‘transcendent background’, God should be kept out of the 
picture altogether. By contrast, Levinas argues that, in responding morally to others, we 
make contact with God (though not the God of traditional Christianity) and that in 
doing so we become more God-like. I attempt to clarify their agreements and differences, 
and I offer some criticisms of their conception of humanity, God, and the relationship 
between them.
INTRODUCTION
Iris Murdoch and Emmanuel Levinas are concerned with the question 
of what it is to be human, and their interest in it is ethical. The notion of 
humanity is understood as an ethical notion: to call someone ‘inhuman’ is 
an intensive way of saying that they are not morally responsive to others. 
This is not intended to explain why it is bad to be morally unresponsive 
to others. They are addressing those who already agree that it is bad to 
the point of inhumanity to rape or kill indiscriminately or to refrain from 
so doing only from cold self-interest.
They both believe that the more divine we are, the more human we 
become.1 This idea admits of various interpretations, some of which 
will offend the sensibilities of those who prefer an atheistic framework. 
Such objectors have nothing to fear from our protagonists: both have 
considerable sympathy for atheism and considerable antipathy for theism. 
1 I take this phrase from Nicholas Lash’s wonderful paper “The Impossibility of 
Atheism”, in Theology for Pilgrims (Darton, Longman and Todd: London, 2008), 27.
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I shall, however, raise a further difficulty with this idea when we look 
more closely at their conception of humanity.
Agreements notwithstanding, their positive positions are harder to 
reconcile. They insist that being (fully) human involves standing in a rela-
tion to the Good, yet Levinas, unlike Murdoch, spells out this relation in 
God-involving terms. I shall argue that this disagreement is verbal, and it 
must remain to be seen whether Murdoch believes in God, whether moral 
realists believe in God, or whether Levinas is a closet atheist.
BEING HUMAN
Murdoch and Levinas’s picture of human being is, at one level, profoundly 
bleak. Murdoch talks of the ‘fat relentless ego’2 who desires to ‘dominate, 
possess, devour and absorb the other’, to ‘subject him to the mechanism 
of (his) own fantasy’.3 Levinas refers to the monopolistic ego which 
conquers and dominates everything that stands in its way.4 They agree 
that an egoistic mode of existence is morally deficient because it precludes 
the possibility of a genuine ethical relation to another person – a relation 
which involves appreciating her independent reality. Murdoch says that 
‘fantasy (self ) can prevent us ... from seeing another person’,5 that our 
direction of attention must be turned outward, away from the self and 
towards the other, 6 and that this movement can ‘bring us to what is 
good’.7 Levinas claims that the other exists ‘outside of the hunger one 
satisfies, the thirst one quenches, and the senses one allays’,8 that by 
relating to the other ‘I am no longer able to have power’9, and that this 
relationship opens up the dimension of the ethical.10
2 “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’”, in The Sovereignty of Good (Routledge: London, 1970), 52.
3 The Fire and the Sun, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1977), 36.
4 See, for example, “Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite”, in Adrian Peperzak, To 
the Other (Purdue University Press: Indiana), 88-120.
5 “On ‘God and ‘Good’”, 70.
6 Ibid., 59.
7 Ibid., 66.
8 “Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite”, 114.
9 Ibid., 110.
10 Ibid.
65murdoch and lEVinas on god and good
An egoistic mode of existence is also metaphysically deficient. It shields 
us from that aspect of reality to which we are responsive when we enter 
the dimension of the ethical – an aspect which provides an analogue 
for ‘how things really are’, and our responsiveness to which is required 
if we are to be fully human. Murdoch calls this dimension ‘the real’.11 
She claims also that realism, as the ability to perceive reality, is a ‘moral 
achievement’, and that it requires a ‘suppression of the self ’.12 True vi-
sion, she says, occasions right conduct. Plato’s Symposium illustrates what 
happens when the ego fades and this vision is realized: we ‘escape from 
the mean petty slavery of the particular case and turn towards the open 
sea of beauty’.13
Levinas agrees that the world of the personal ego is metaphysically 
deficient, and he likewise cites Plato in his account of the shift required as 
we move from the limiting framework of the egoist to one which involves 
an appreciation of the Good. He expresses this by saying that it situates 
the Good above Being, and he cites Plato’s Phaedrus as the ancestor of 
this position.14 Like Murdoch, he is gesturing towards a conception of 
reality which is irreducibly moral, and essentially refers to the needs and 
desires of others. We are moved towards an ‘ethics of responsibility for 
the Other’;15 we are propelled towards Goodness.16
GOD
Murdoch holds that morality is unavoidable, that we forsake it only at 
the cost of our humanity. Morality is also central to genuine religion, 
but both religion and morality are compromised when defined in God-
11 “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’, 59.
12 Ibid., 66. 
13 This claim is to be found at 210D of The Symposium.
14 “Philosophy and the Idea of the infinite”, 106.
15 “The Thinking of Being and the Question of the Other”, in Of God Who Comes to 
Mind, trans., Bettina Bergo (Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 1998), 121.
16 “God and Philosophy”, in Of God Who Comes to Mind, 69.
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involving terms.17 She recommends that we ‘remove’ the traditional notion 
of God.18
‘God’ is the name for a supernatural person. It makes a difference whether we 
believe in such a person, as it makes a difference whether Christ rose from 
the dead. These differences do not generally, or do not yet, affect whether or 
not people are virtuous.19
Christianity can perhaps continue without this personal God, and ‘without 
beliefs in supernatural places and happenings, such as heaven and life after 
death’. She approves of the way in which religion ‘is detaching itself from 
supernatural dogma’.20
This implies that we should abandon ‘God’ for ‘Good’, and allow that 
religion is:
a mode of belief in the unique sovereign place of goodness or virtue in human 
life. One might put it flatly by saying that there is something about moral 
value which goes jusqu’au bout. It must go all the way, to the base, to the top, 
it must be everywhere… It adheres essentially to the conception of being 
human, and cannot be detached; and we may express this by saying that it 
is not accidental, does not exist contingently, is above being.21
So we get the following picture: God is a supernatural person, and belief 
in God involves a commitment to supernatural dogma. Such belief is sup-
posed to make some kind of difference, but it makes no moral difference, 
and is irrelevant therefore to what it is to be human. The dimension of 
reality to which God talk refers is ‘detached’ from human reality, because 
there is no evidence for the existence of such a being. It is also detached 
from Good because Good is internally related to human reality, and the 
existence of a supernatural being could have no bearing on moral conduct. 
As Murdoch insists, the moral person is good ‘for nothing’. Being good 
‘for something’ would involve some non-moral motive – the desire for 
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salvation, for example – a motive which would be part and parcel of the 
egoism which the reference to goodness was intended to break.22 Small 
wonder that Murdoch is happy to assume that there is no God,23 and 
to defend a conception of religion and morality which dispenses with 
Him.
Karl Rahner attacks the kind of God taken for granted by 
Murdoch:
That God really does not exist who operates and functions as an individual 
existent alongside other existents, and who would thus as it were be a member 
of the larger household of all reality. Anyone in search of such a God is 
searching for a false God. Both atheism and a more naïve form of theism 
labour under the same false notion of God, only the former denies it while 
the latter believes that it can make sense of it. Both are basically false: the 
latter, the notion that naïve theism has, because this God does not exist; and 
the former, atheism, because God is the most radical, the most original, and 
in a certain sense the most self-evident reality.24
From Rahner’s perspective, Murdoch has a faulty conception of God. 
She supposes that God is just a god – a being on the same level as any 
other being in reality. More powerful, perhaps, but vastly inferior to the 
goodness which, like Rahner’s God, is ‘the most original, and in a certain 
sense the most self-evident reality’, and that without which we would 
cease to be human.25
Rahner’s position is now a commonplace in theology, perhaps it always 
was. Nevertheless, a long line of theologians and philosophers have sought 
to rescue us from the kind of misconception presupposed by Murdoch, 
and one such figure is Levinas. Levinas riles against approaches to the 
question of God which set it apart from the question of what it is to be 
human. They make the God question into something highly abstract, 
and sever the connection between religion and ethics. This leads one 
to suppose that the question of God is a theoretical question, and that 
22 Compare: ‘Almost anything that consoles us is a fake’. (“On ‘God’ and ‘Good’”, 59.
23 “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’, 75.
24 Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, trans. 
William V. Dych, (Darton, Longman and Todd: London, 1978), 63. 
25 Ibid., p.63.
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religion is a matter of theorizing about God. Wedded to the idea that 
God is divorced from anything remotely human, this can quickly lead to 
the conclusion that He does not exist, and that it does not matter much 
anyway (Murdoch). Even if we resist this sceptical response in favour of 
continued theoretical investigation, this can only compromise an idea 
which, for Levinas, is fundamental, namely, that God cannot be grasped 
by human thought. Finally, this approach ends up ignoring the question 
how we should treat others.
Even if we distrust a theoretical approach to God, this can give rise to 
an equally problematic alternative: surrender to mystical abandon. Levinas 
has no time for this ‘human elevation’. ‘The Sacred that envelops and 
transports me is a form of violence’, that is, it is ‘contrary to the educa-
tion of man’.26 It is violent because it ‘annuls the links between persons’, 
and leads the individual to ‘founder’ in a false form of ecstasy in which 
feeling is given precedence and ‘the conditions for action and effort’ are 
annulled.27 It is contrary to the education of man because it leads one yet 
again to ignore the demands of others. There can be no relating to God 
in such a context, and no possibility therefore of becoming fully human: 
it is an ecstasy which [violently] tears man away from his essence, from 
his human nature.28
A related criticism of surrender to God by feeling alone is that this 
‘consolation of divine presence’ casts humanity in the role of a helpless 
child who turns to God in the way that one might turn to a parent.29 
Again, the requirements of ethics are silenced, and God’s nature is seri-
ously compromised – he becomes an inhabitant of ‘the child’s heaven’, 
a consoling father figure who satisfies our need for security. Levinas 
concurs with Murdoch’s complaint that ‘almost anything that consoles 
us is a fake’. A God of this kind will never live up to our expectations. 
Prayers will go unanswered, consolation will give way to frustration, and 
atheism will follow quickly in its wake. For Levinas this atheist response 
26 “A Religion for Adults” in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand, 
(The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore), 14. 
27 Ibid, 15.
28 Ibid, 15.
29 “Loving the Torah more than God”, trans. Sean Hand, in Difficult Freedom: Essays 
on Judaism,143.
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is a positive step: we are freed from an infantile conception of God,30 
and the way is paved towards a religion which accords due weight to the 
ethical – a ‘religion for adults’.
So Murdoch and Levinas have much in common. They reject a con-
ception of God which sets Him apart from the realm of the ethical and 
which makes His existence irrelevant to the question how we are to fulfil 
our humanity. Both attest the liberating effect of atheism. For Murdoch, it 
accepts that there is no God, and, unsurprisingly, she is happy to embrace 
such a standpoint, believing that it holds out the prospect of defining 
a conception of humanity which can give more adequate expression to the 
insights which drive traditional theism. However, she warns of the dan-
gers of a natural consequence of atheism – ‘a stripped and empty scene’31 
in which morality ‘is pictured without any transcendent background’.32 
On this way of thinking – typical of existentialist atheism - morality 
is ‘essentially centred on the individual’,33 and ‘however grandiose the 
structure may be in terms of which a morality extends itself, the moral 
agent is responsible for endowing this structure with value’. 34 The result 
is a ‘false transcendence’ in which ‘value’ is attached to the human will.35 
On her preferred alternative, the individual is ‘held in a framework that 
transcends him, and towards which he is tentatively moving’, 36 and 
discovering what is morally good is a matter of discovering that reality, 
and ‘integrating himself with it’,37 however ‘impossibly difficult’ that task 
might turn out to be.
Here then is Murdoch’s account of the available alternatives. First, 
we have the God-involving option. This panders to our all too egoistic 
tendencies and makes no sense of our capacity to be good. Second, we 
have an atheist option which has a similar dehumanizing effect. It involves 
a commitment to the same egoistic self, and assumes likewise that Good, 
30 Ibid.




34 Ibid., 71. 
35 “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’”, 58.
36 “Metaphysics and Ethics”, 70.
37 Ibid.
70 fiona Ellis
if it enters the picture at all, must be constructed from the resources of 
this self. Finally, her own preferred standpoint is that in which the self 
inhabits a moral framework which is not of its own making and which 
grants it the possibility of transcending its egoistic preoccupations in order 
to acknowledge and to act upon the moral demands of others.
Levinas’s take on atheism is rather more complex. We must reject the 
conception of God which Murdoch discards. However, he would question 
Murdoch’s claim that there is no God on three scores. First, it is the 
response of one who is simply rejecting an infantile conception of God. 
Second, this rejection can lead the way to the true God. Third, it is only 
by embracing the true God that we shall vindicate the kind of position 
which, for Murdoch, can be articulated only by reference to the idea of 
goodness. For Levinas, we must move beyond the egoistic framework 
which remains in place provided that God is no more than a consoling 
father in the sky, and acknowledge our responsibilities to others. This 
movement requires that the self initially finds himself ‘outside of God’,38 
and cast back upon himself. This is the starting-point for genuine ethical 
engagement (no more passing the buck to an interventionist God). Yet, he 
allows also (once more in agreement with Murdoch) that this movement 
outward is not inevitable, that one can remain embroiled in a mode of 
existence in which egoistic concerns are paramount. He assigns Heidegger 
to this level, citing his analysis of care in Being and Time – an analysis 
which, as Levinas sees it, ignores the ethical dimension.39
So Murdoch and Levinas agree that reference to God can impede 
moral development. They agree also that there are atheist alternatives 
which have a similar dehumanizing effect, and that a satisfactory posi-
tion must give due weight to our moral relations to others. Murdoch 
believes that this becomes available once we trade in God for Good, 
whilst acknowledging that this move doesn’t come easy.40 Levinas agrees 
that the comforting position is the easier one, but describes his preferred 
38 Totality and Infinity:An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Martinus 
Nijhoff: The Hague, 1979), 58.
39 See Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis, (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 
1978), 44.
40 “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, in The Sovereignty of Good, 100. 
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alternative in God-involving terms: it requires trading in a false god for 
the true God.
MURDOCH ON GOOD
Murdoch has more time for God than she sometimes lets on. She claims 
that moral philosophy should retain a central concept which has all of 
the characteristics we associate with God, where God ‘was (or is) a single 
perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention’.41 
What is a real object of attention? How does it relate to Murdoch’s claim 
that by attending to it we attain a ‘true vision’ of reality? The metaphor 
of vision is liable to mislead, and it is easy to conclude that Murdoch has 
in mind the self-enclosed mystical abandon which Levinas rejects. She 
insists, however, that true vision occasions right conduct, and that what 
she is getting at belongs to the moral life of the ordinary person. It is 
perfectly fine to say that the background to morals is ‘some sort of mysti-
cism’, provided that this is understood aright. It involves no ‘complicated 
secret doctrine’, it is not ‘removed from ordinary life’, and there is no ‘elite 
of mystics’. It is an ‘unesoteric mysticism’42 involving ‘a non-dogmatic 
essentially unformulated faith in the reality of the Good’.43 This faith 
resists strict proof, but becomes intelligible and defensible insofar as we 
can relate to others in moral terms.44
What of Murdoch’s claim that the object of attention is transcendent? 
She tells us that the idea of the transcendent belongs to morality ‘in 
some form or other’, but is difficult to interpret and readily assumes 
false forms. 45 We have already considered the false forms at work when 
the transcendent assumes the guise of a consoling God, or when value 
is taken to be a construction of the individual human will. But what is 
true transcendence? Murdoch’s discussion operates on several levels. One 
theme is that, in moral contexts, attention is directed away from the self 
41 “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’, 55.
42 “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, 92.




and towards the other. Responsiveness to the other furnishes one sense in 
which talk of transcendence might be appropriate, that we can transcend 
or move towards another person, and in doing so, leave egoistic concerns 
behind. Furthermore, insofar as the world of the egoist is limiting and 
not ‘fully real’, such transcendence leads us away from a false reality, but 
not into some weird supernatural realm. We simply leave behind the 
self-enclosed world of the egoist.
What of the idea that the Good towards which we are transcending 
is itself transcendent? Murdoch says: “ ‘Good is a transcendent reality’ 
means that virtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness 
and join the world as it really is’.46 It means no such thing, of course, but 
we can read between the lines and discern what it might mean to say that 
Good is transcendent. It transcends the realm of selfish consciousness, 
which means that it cannot be constructed from such a level. The idea 
that Goodness transcends the realm of selfish consciousness clarifies 
some other things Murdoch says about Goodness, for example, that it is 
not in this world, and that it is ‘incorruptible’. 47 It is not in this world 
since it does not belong to the realm of selfish consciousness, and it is 
incorruptible because it resists all attempts to be possessed or destroyed.
Elsewhere Murdoch suggests a more radical interpretation of the 
claim that Goodness is not in this world. She claims that it is ‘to some 
extent mysterious’48, that it is ‘not visible’,49 and that ‘it cannot be expe-
rienced, even when we see the unselfish man in the concentration camp.50 
She then asks: ‘what is it for someone who is not a religious believer and 
not some sort of mystic, to apprehend some separate ‘form’ of goodness 
behind the multifarious cases of good behaviour?’ 51The implication now 
is that Goodness transcends not merely selfish consciousness but also 
the dimension in which right conduct finds expression. What could this 
mean? Murdoch is clear enough about what it could not mean. This 
separate form of Goodness is not to be comprehended in the terms 
46 “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, 93.
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assumed by the religious believer, treating it as a supernatural person. It 
is not the object of an esoteric mystical apprehension. It is not, however, 
visible. Goodness’s invisibility puts paid to the idea that it could be an 
object of mystical awareness, but what kind of apprehension is at issue? 
Murdoch claims:
The only genuine way to be good is to be good ‘for nothing’….That ‘for noth-
ing’ is indeed the experienced correlate of the invisibility or non-representable 
blankness of the idea of Good itself. 52
We can begin to see what is going on here by focusing upon the idea of 
being good ‘for something’, of being good for some purpose specifiable 
in non-moral terms. For example, I help you out because you’ve promised 
me a nice reward, or because I think God has promised me an even nicer 
reward. In such a case Goodness becomes, if not visible, then at least 
something comprehensible. It is a matter of getting rewards, pleasure, or 
whatever. By contrast, when we are good ‘for nothing’, these explanations 
are unavailable, and all that we can say is that we are good for the sake 
of Goodness. Once we reach this point, we are led towards the idea that 
Goodness itself is invisible and non-representable.
Much of this recalls G.E. Moore’s arguments about the indefin-
ability of ‘Good’, and one interpretation of these arguments is that they 
reject any attempt to analyse Goodness in non-moral terms. However, 
this allows the possibility of elucidating Goodness in moral terms, and 
Murdoch herself seems happy to concede this, when she talks of how we 
might clarify our understanding of Goodness by spelling out the relations 
between different virtues.53 However, she clearly wants to go further, and 
uses Moore to illustrate her position:
Good is indefinable… because of the infinite difficulty of the task of ap-
prehending a magnetic but inexhaustible reality. Moore was in a way nearer 
to the truth than he realized when he tried to say both that Good was there 
and that one could say nothing of what it essentially was. 54
52 Ibid., 71.
53 Ibid., 57-8.
54 “The Idea of Perfection”, in Existentialists and Mystics, 333.
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Clearly, the force of the claim that we can say nothing about Goodness 
is not simply that it cannot be captured in non-moral terms, but that its 
very nature exceeds any attempt to grasp it. Elsewhere she says:
There is a magnetic centre. But it is easier to look at the converging edges 
than to look at the centre itself. We do not and probably cannot know, 
conceptualise, what it is like in the centre.55
Goodness is unknowable in itself, but we respond to its magnetic pull and 
resist the more consoling alternatives thrown up by the egoistic self. We 
respond to its magnetic pull by relating to others in moral terms, and then 
we have an apprehension of the Good. This apprehension is ‘apprehension 
of the individual and the real’.56 For Murdoch, ‘“the individual” is the 
central concept of morality’, and given the emphasis she places upon our 
moral relations to others, we naturally suppose that she means human 
individuals. This is borne out by some of her remarks. Having said that 
morality involves attention to individuals, she offers ‘human individuals’ as 
a case in point.57 However, the individual qua central concept of morality 
clearly refers also to the ‘separate form of goodness which lies behind the 
multifarious cases of good behaviour’, this ‘single supreme value concept’ 
which orders and unifies our moral world,58 and exerts its authority from 
an unknowable and invisible ‘beyond’.59
Murdoch draws a threefold distinction between a self-enclosed realm 
of egoistic consciousness, an ethical dimension of behaving well towards 
others, and a separate form of Goodness. The second two levels cannot 
be reduced to or constructed from the first, but the relation between the 
second and third levels is less clear. A separate form of Goodness behind 
our multifarious good behaviour suggests that Goodness is metaphysically 
distinct from the second level of reality. She insists, however, that it is 
not an object of experience or thought, and can be glimpsed only via our 
ethical relations to others. So, apparently, it is metaphysically distinct 
55 “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, 100. See also “On ‘God’ and 
‘Good’”, 75. 
56 “The Idea of Perfection”, in Existentialists and Mystics, 333.
57 Ibid, 334.
58 “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’”, 57-58.
59 Ibid., 62.
75murdoch and lEVinas on god and good
from the second level of reality, but epistemologically dependent upon 
it. Our knowledge of it, such as it is, is irreducibly practical: true vision 
occasions right conduct.
LEVINAS ON GOD
‘The vision of God is a moral act. This optics is ethics’.60 In saying this, 
Levinas offers a version of Murdoch’s claim that ‘true vision occasions 
right conduct’. Like Murdoch, he dissociates talk of vision from mystical 
flights of fancy, insisting that the central concept of morality – God – can 
be apprehended only via our ethical encounters with others. That this 
mode of apprehension can never do complete justice to the nature of God 
is a necessary and welcome corollary of God’s transcendence.
Like Murdoch, he deploys several notions of transcendence. The first 
is our moving or transcending towards a dimension of reality in which we 
are morally responsive to others. This movement does not have its origin 
in selfish consciousness whose ‘totalizing’ constructions are pitched at the 
level of ‘being’. Rather, it is effected from without, from a realm which is 
‘otherwise than being’, ‘infinite’, and ‘ethical’,61 and our responsiveness 
to which liberates us from the clutches of egoism.
The idea that this new dimension of reality is ‘infinite’ and ‘otherwise 
than being’ introduces a second notion of transcendence: that the real-
ity towards which we are moving is itself transcendent. We recall that 
Murdoch deploys two notions of transcendence in this further sense, the 
first referring to an ethical dimension beyond selfish consciousness, the 
second referring to something beyond this moral dimension – Goodness 
in itself. It is here that Levinas seems to part company with Murdoch. 
First, he denies that there is anything beyond the level of moral engage-
ment with others, whether a separate form of Goodness or a separate God, 
and he applies the descriptions which Murdoch applies to Good - infinite, 
invisible, etc. – to the human other. Levinas has three reasons for denying 
60 “For a Jewish Humanism”, trans. Sean Hand, in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, 
op.cit., 275.
61 Existence and Existents, 31.
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that God is to be set apart from the realm in which we interact morally 
with others. It compromises the reality of God, it severs the connection 
between religion and ethics, and it compromises our humanity. It sounds 
odd to say that the reality of God is compromised if He is taken to be 
distinct from the realm in which we interact morally with others. It would 
be natural to protest that His reality is preserved only by maintaining 
this distinction, and the alternative reduces religion to ethics without 
remainder.
Levinas is not seeking to reduce religion to ethics if this means that 
ethics involves no reference to God. However, he believes that it is es-
sential that God is not set apart from the ethical realm, as He is when 
treated as the Supreme Being who can be apprehended in terms which 
bear no relation to this realm. Such treatment puts God at the service 
of egoistic consciousness – he becomes, at best, a God for us; the ap-
prehension it presupposes, insofar as it ignores aspects of our being which 
come into play when we become morally responsive to others, profoundly 
dehumanizes us. It is only by becoming morally responsive to others that 
we fulfil our humanity and stand in a proper relation to God:
I approach the infinite insofar as I forget myself for my neighbour who looks 
at me…. A you is inserted between the I and the absolute He.62
“Going towards God” is meaningless unless seen in terms of my primary 
going towards the other person.63
Without the significance they draw from ethics, theological concepts remain 
empty and formal frameworks. 64
God is not a something to be apprehended in non-moral terms, but it 
doesn’t follow that he is nothing. We ‘go towards God’ by going towards 
62 Collected Philosophical Papers, ed. Alphonso Lingis (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 
1987), 72-3.
63 Face to Face with Levinas, trans. Richard Cohen (University of New York Press: 
Albany, NY, 1986), 23.
64 Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, 79.
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the other person: ‘a you is inserted between the I and the absolute He’. 
This model seems bound to fall short of taking us all the way to God. 
Not for Levinas, however, for he characterizes the other in terms which 
eliminate this distance. How is this supposed to work?
LEVINAS ON THE OTHER
The moral relationship in which I stand towards the other ‘puts me into 
question, empties me of myself ’,65 by releasing me from the confines of 
egoism. This disruption of the self occurs when I encounter the face of 
the other, and ‘the dimension of the divine opens forth in the human 
face’.66 Why the face of the other? Levinas is not interested in physical 
appearance, but in the way in which the other:
(o)ppose(s) himself to me beyond all measure, with the total uncoveredness 
and nakedness of his defenseless eyes… Here is established a relationship 
with the absolute Other, with the resistance of what has no resistance, with 
ethical resistance…We call a face the epiphany of what can thus present itself 
directly, and therefore also exteriorly, to an I.67
The notion of the face captures the sense in which the other exists not 
simply as someone to be used or possessed, but, rather, as someone who 
forbids such treatment. Our encounter with the other involves a moral 
awakening in which I discover my responsibility for the other: ‘I see 
myself obligated with respect to the Other’.68
The idea that I am obligated with respect to the other is intended 
to have important implications for a proper understanding of God and 
man. We recall that the picture of God as an indulgent father figure not 
only compromises His reality but our humanity too, by making us into 
helpless children who take no responsibility for ourselves and for others. 
Levinas counters this with a God who ‘renounces all aids to manifestation, 
65 Basic Philosophical Writings, ed., Adriann Peperzak, Simon Critchley, Robert 
Bernasconi, (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1N, 1964), 52.
66 Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, 178.
67 “Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite”, 110.
68 “A Religion for Adults”, 21-2.
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and appeals instead to the full maturity of the responsible man’.69 We 
can fulfil our humanity only if God does not ‘manifest himself in any way 
as a help’ or assume our ‘duties and responsibilities’.70 So the true God 
does not manifest Himself in any way as a help, and can be approached 
only via moral relations with others. The other is ‘invisible’,71 the ‘vision 
of the face is not an experience’,72 and ‘to see a face is already to hear ‘you 
shall not kill’.73 The other is ‘situated in the dimension of height, in the 
ideal, the Divine, and through my relation to the Other, I am in touch 
with God’.74
It begins to sound as if the other just is God. Yet if this is so, what of 
the ‘you’ inserted between the ‘I’ and the ‘absolute He’? If the ‘you’ just is 
God, the step from human other to God is surely eliminated. Then we end 
up compromising the reality either of God – by making Him human – or 
of the human other – by making him God. The first alternative suggests 
that Levinas has reduced religion to ethics, and that he differs from 
Murdoch only in the sense that he has transposed her descriptions of 
Goodness on to the human person. The second alternative suggests that he 
has inflated ethics into religion, and left us with nothing but a theological 
analogue of Murdoch’s separable form of Goodness.
When Levinas tells us that the vision of the face is not an experi-
ence, he follows this up with the claim that it is ‘a moving out of oneself, 
a contact with another being and not simply a sensation of self ’. So, the 
force of saying that the other is invisible is to lend emphasis to this 
outward movement and to the moral significance that it bears – to see 
a face is already to hear ‘you shall not kill’! As Murdoch herself agrees, 
true vision can never simply stare.
Even if true vision does not stare – whether at the face of the other, 
Goodness itself, or God Himself – questions remain: how does my rela-
tion to the other put me in touch with God? Clearly Levinas is not 
claiming that the other grants me a beatific vision of God. So ethics 
69 “Loving the Torah More Than God”, 143.
70 “A Religion for Adults”, 20.
71 Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, 51.
72 “Ethics and Spirit”, trans. Sean Hand, in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, 10.
73 Ibid., 8.
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is not inflated into religion in this sense. Nor would it make sense to 
say on his behalf that the other just is God. For not only does he insist 
upon the fundamental difference between Creator and created, but he 
describes the other in terms which emphasise not just to such God-like 
attributes as ‘height’ and ‘invisibility’, but equally those which express 
her vulnerability and neediness. The other for whom I am responsible is 
an ordinary human being.
So, the other does not put me in touch with God in any of these ways. 
Rather, she opens up a horizon in which I become morally responsive 
and responsible. It is only at this point that the ‘God of heaven’ becomes 
accessible, and does so ‘without losing any of His transcendence’ and 
‘without denying freedom to the believer’. 75 The idea that God becomes 
accessible only via our moral relations to others shows that our relation 
to Him can never be direct and can only be ethically mediated. A direct 
relation with God would compromise His transcendence, and it would 
imply that we can be in communion with God whilst ignoring our 
moral responsibilities. We ignore these responsibilities only at the cost 
of compromising our humanity, and our humanity is compromised the 
moment we relate to a less than transcendent God. We can now appreciate 
the force of his claim that God – the true God - becomes accessible 
without losing any of His transcendence and without denying freedom 
to the believer.
Although Levinas rejects any attempt to bring God down to earth, 
his characterization of what it is to be truly human narrows the gap 
between God and man in a further respect. For he implies that, in our 
ethical encounters with others, we ourselves become more God-like: an 
equality is established ‘between God and man at the very heart of their 
disproportion’.76 Talk of equality between God and man makes it look as 
if Levinas again risks undermining the distinction between God and man. 
Thus our responsibility for the other involves ‘the transubstantiation of 
the Creator into the creature’, ‘(t)he ‘I’ is the one who, before all decision, 
is elected to bear all the responsibility for the World’.77 He insists also 
75 Ibid.,18.
76 “Loving the Torah More Than God”, 145.
77 “A Man-God?”, trans. Michael B. Smith, in Entre Nous, (Continuum Press: London, 
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that this responsibility cannot be annulled: ‘The world in which pardon 
is all-powerful becomes inhuman’. 78 Such talk seems to turn the subject 
into God. It also recalls certain existentialists, whose stance Murdoch 
calls ‘an irresponsible and undirected self assertion’. But the qualification 
that the equality of God and man is established at the heart of their 
disproportion rules out a straightforward identification of the two, and 
differentiates Levinas from Murdoch’s existentialist. But how then is it 
to be interpreted? And can it be squared with his insistence– shared by 
Murdoch - that the idea of an incarnate God is a scandal?79
For Levinas, the God of Christianity is a false, indulgent God who 
assumes our duties and responsibilities, and encloses us in our wickedness.80 
The Incarnation throws up someone who takes responsibility for our sins, 
guarantees salvation by proxy, and leaves us to bask in our inhumanity. 
The interpretation is massively flawed,81 but it explains instantly why he 
rejects such a vision, and guides us towards an understanding of his own 
preferred take upon the idea of an incarnate God. The essential require-
ment is that our status as morally responsible beings be accommodated, 
and it is met with the claim that we ‘bear all the responsibility for the 
world’. This sounds terribly austere, and I shall consider some related 
worries in the following section. For the moment, it suffices to note 
that this austere vision ‘in no way leads to the inhumanity of despair’, 
because God ‘is patient…lets time pass, awaits the return of man, his 
separation or regeneration.’ But this regeneration must take place ‘without 
the intervention of extrahuman factors other than consciousness of the 
Good, and the Law’. 82
Where does this leave the idea that the creator is transubstantiated 
into the creature? By assuming our responsibilities and offering ourselves 
up to the service of others – even to the point of self-sacrifice - we become 
78 “A Religion for Adults”, 20.
79 See Michael Purcell, Levinas and Theology (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
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equal partners with God. Not by becoming God, but by becoming more 
like God, and in becoming more like God we become truly human. In 
this sense Levinas is committed to the idea that the more divine we are, 
the more human we become.
GOD AND HUMANITY, AGAIN
The idea that we become more God-like by giving ourselves to others 
seems to have important implications for an understanding of God. For 
our divinity, such as it is, is now a matter of giving – of being there for 
others: ‘I am for (the Other)’. 83 Now if self-giving makes us more like 
God, then the obvious conclusion is that God Himself is the supreme 
giver. Not, of course, in the sense that He gives out little prizes from on 
high, but in the sense that He gives Himself. What could this mean?
Nicholas Lash has argued that this way of thinking about God leads 
us away from the temptation to suppose that He is a thing, and expresses 
the idea that, in Him, the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘does’ gains no 
application: 84 ‘the holy mystery of God simply is the giving, the uttering, 
the breathing, that God is said to be and do’. 85 Lash cites God’s meeting 
with Moses at the burning bush, and God’s response when asked ‘Who 
shall I tell them sent me?’ God’s reply is ‘I am who I am’. It is generally 
agreed that this reply is not to be interpreted in ontological terms, if this 
would imply that God is some kind of being. Another suggestion – taken 
seriously by Franz Rosenzweig – is that it is best translated as ‘the one-
who-is-there’ i.e. there for us, coming towards us. 86 This interpretation 
makes sense of God’s earlier claim ‘you cannot see my face’. 87 It explains 
also why this meeting assumes such importance for Levinas, and why 
83 “Ethics and Spirit”, 7.
84 ‘The Impossibility of Atheism’, 23. 
85 Ibid.
86 This is the position taken by Franz Rosenzweig in his ‘A Letter to Martin Goldner’, 
in M. Buber and F. Rosenzweig: Scripture and Translation, trans. Lawrence Rosenwald 
with Everett Fox (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1994). Quoted in Janet Soskice, 
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he turns to it in discussing God’s invisibility and unknowability.88 But 
what more can be said about God’s movement towards us? How is this 
movement to be related to our moral movement towards others? And 
how does all this fit with Levinas’s claim that we can know Him only via 
this moral movement?
That God moves towards us, when coupled with the idea that we 
glimpse this movement only by responding morally to others, suggests 
two things. First, we are capable of partaking in this movement; second, 
the movement is irreducibly moral. Our partaking in this movement 
amounts to our becoming more God-like, and this lends further substance 
to the idea that God is a giver. God gives Himself to us in the sense 
that He makes us more God-like, and we become more God-like, 
and hence, more in touch with God, insofar as we become morally 
responsive beings.
We can agree that a human being should be morally responsive to oth-
ers. However, both Murdoch and Levinas imply that this responsiveness 
requires a total suppression of the self, where this seems to rule out the 
possibility of having any concern for our own well-being. They suggest 
that a proper human being is a total giver, rather being a mixture of giver 
and taker. This idea is difficult to accept. A total suppression of the self 
would leave nothing remaining but the activity of giving – a consequence 
which is difficult to square with the fact that those who do good deeds 
usually want to do them themselves. 89 If a total giver is no more human 
than the mixture of giver and taker, there are important implications for 
our understanding and assessment of the claim that the more divine we 
are, the more human we become. For, assuming that God is a total giver, 
this claim must be rejected: we become human by becoming more divine 
only up to a point.
One alternative is to reject the assumption that God is a total giver. 
It is of fundamental importance to Levinas that God does not reduce 
88 See, for example, “Revelation in the Jewish Tradition”, in The Levinas Reader, ed. 
Sean Hand (Blackwell: Oxford, 1989), 204. 
89 Compare also Benedict XVI: ‘Man cannot always give, he must also receive’. Deus 
Caritas Est, Encylical Letter, given on December 25, 2005. Available at http://www.vatican.
va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-
caritas-est_en.html
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people to dependency. God retains the distance required for us to do 
the required moral work, he allows us to stand on our own two feet 
and assume responsibility for self and world. This provides one way of 
denying that God is a total giver. And it has important implications for 
what is required if we are to be God-like in our dealings with others. We 
become God-like to the extent that we withhold goods from others which 
would reduce them to dependency. The idea is important, but reasonable 
self-interest surely goes further. I can keep something back for myself, 
even if others would get more out of it than I will.
The question whether God could be self-interested in this sense must 
remain unanswered. However, we have said enough to raise difficulties 
with the idea that being human requires total suppression of the self, and 
that this suppression makes us more God-like. Murdoch can sidestep the 
theological difficulties by discarding God. However, she shares Levinas’s 
antipathy for self-interest, and she retains a version of the claim that the 
more divine we are the more human we become. Her version of divinity 
consists in partaking in Goodness. It remains to be seen whether we can 
find a significant disagreement between them.
BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD
Murdoch locates the source of true morality ‘in an austere and unconsoled 
love of the Good’.90 Goodness comes from a beyond which resists all 
attempts to comprehend it; it can be grasped, if at all, only via our moral 
dealings with others. Here then, Murdoch says nothing with which 
Levinas could disagree. Levinas transposes the properties she ascribes 
to Goodness – invisibility, infinity, and so forth - onto the human other. 
His intention, we recall, is to capture the sense in which the other opens 
up a dimension where we can become morally responsive and thus move 
towards God. Murdoch agrees that Goodness can be ‘envisaged’ only in 
practical terms. Yet again then, there is no obvious discrepancy. Crucially, 
however, Murdoch insists that Goodness is impersonal, even whilst ac-
knowledging that a dissenter might say:
90 “The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts”, 92.
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To speak of Good in this portentous manner is simply to speak of the old 
concept of God in a thin disguise. But at least ‘God’ could play a real consol-
ing and encouraging role. It makes sense to speak of loving God, a person, 
but very little sense to speak of loving Good, a concept. ‘Good’…is not 
likely to inspire, or even be comprehensible to, more than a small number 
of mystically minded people who, being reluctant to surrender ‘God’, fake 
up ‘Good’ in his image, so as to preserve some kind of hope. 91
Murdoch has little time for a consoling God, nor does Levinas. She resists 
reserving Goodness for the mystical minority, in favour of a mysticism 
belonging squarely within the province of any decent human being: it 
offers ‘the least corruptible and most realistic picture for us to use in 
our reflections upon the moral life’. Levinas is no friend of corruptible 
pictures, but he refuses to surrender the idea of God. So have we finally 
identified a substantive disagreement, a disagreement over whether the 
central concept of morality is to be described in personal terms? This is 
what Levinas says:
A personal and unique God is not something revealed like an image in a dark 
room! The text I have just commented upon shows how ethics and principles 
install a personal relationship worthy of the name. Loving the Torah even 
more than God means precisely having access to a personal God against 
Whom one may rebel – that is to say, for whom one may die.92
Levinas’s God is a personal God, but not a consoling God. God does not 
manifest Himself as a help. Is He an encouraging God? In one sense, He 
is not. He becomes present in His absence, and in His absence discourages 
our love.93 But in another sense He is encouraging, for He ‘fills us with 
higher thoughts’, and leads us to fulfil our humanity, to become more 
divine. Again, there is nothing here with which Murdoch could take 
issue, for she happily allows that we can be divine in this sense. Can we 
love Him? We can love him, Levinas claims, in the only way possible, 
namely, by loving the Torah, i.e. by loving His moral demands. This is 
91 “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’, 72.
92 “Loving the Torah more than God”, 40. See also “Revelation in the Jewish 
Tradition”, 195-6.
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surely what Murdoch is getting at when she entertains the possibility of 
loving Good. Any difference in their positions beyond this point is surely 
extinguished in that inexhaustible and infinite reality which, as they both 
believe, must ever elude our grasp.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Murdoch and Levinas hold that we fulfil our humanity by relating to 
others morally, and only by so relating do we gain a partial grasp of 
something whose nature is unknowable. Both figures take themselves to 
be articulating a true form of religion. They agree also that the ‘vision’ they 
offer is austere when placed alongside the more consoling alternatives. 
Does it matter whether we describe the position in God-involving terms? 
In one sense, it does not. We can see why Murdoch refuses to do so. The 
inadequacy of her reasons for refusal might also recommend sympathy 
for Levinas’s terminology. On the other hand, one could protest that his 
own conception of God is problematic, and his criticisms of Christianity 
wide of the mark. This gains more credence once we acknowledge his 
own take on incarnation, and ask whether a further nod in the direction 
of Christianity would be so disastrous. I suspect not.
Even if we could defend such a move, the question remains whether 
the position – however we describe it – is correct. I have argued that 
Murdoch and Levinas are wrong to require total suppression of the self. 
Does the modification this suggests have important theological impli-
cations? Well, it might lead us to reject the demand to become more 
God-like, if this requires that we become total givers. As I have said, 
however, what it really means to be God-like is unclear as it stands. And 
given Murdoch and Levinas’s agreement on all the important issues, the 
advantages and disadvantages of God-talk are negligible.
One way of developing the issue is to ask whether we should accept 
a form of moral realism, and, if so, whether moral realists should talk 
like our two protagonists. Murdoch assumes that a morality with no 
transcendent background can only be ‘centred on the individual’. But 
it remains open that the framework which transcends the individual is 
the collective product of her community. On this account, morality is 
86 fiona Ellis
a collective creation, irreducible to egoism, yet it requires no transcen-
dental background. This gap in her argument can perhaps be closed: First, 
we can ask why the individual should follow the shared norms of her 
community. Presumably she will be motivated to do so only if she has 
respect for others, and if she lacks such respect she will do as she pleases. 
So, serious participation in the norms of a community presupposes respect 
for others, and such respect cannot itself be a collective creation. Second, 
a paradigmatic collective creation is etiquette, and we distinguish etiquette 
from morality. So, morality is distinguished from what we acknowledge 
to be collective creations.
This much might lead us towards moral realism, but we are returned 
to the questions how we are to interpret the transcendence of morality, 
and whether our protagonists’ interpretation is acceptable. They locate 
the central concept of morality beyond our grasp: Goodness has a tran-
scendent source. Contemporary moral realists allow that there is always 
room for improvement in our moral beliefs, but few would find the kind 
of difficulty which would arise if the ultimate object of our moral quest 
were transcendent in the sense implied by Murdoch and Levinas.94 They 
would also reject the idea that this object is personal, but their reasons, 
I suspect, would be based upon similar misunderstandings to those we 
found in Murdoch.
So are there any good reasons for saying that the source of Goodness 
is transcendent, or, if you prefer, that Goodness itself is transcendent? 
Murdoch implies that if it is not, then the normative force of morality 
– the authority of moral requirements – is undermined. Most contem-
porary moral realists would disagree, although John Cottingham takes 
this consideration seriously.95 Where this leaves us is unclear. But if the 
present investigation has shown anything it is that we must continue to 
press such questions and that both sides, or all sides, should be prepared 
to enter into open-minded dialogue, and to do so without prejudging 
the issue at the outset by assuming that their opponents are half wits. 
94 For the idea that room for improvement in our beliefs about a given realm is not 
only compatible with the objectivity of that realm, but a requirement of its objectivity, see 
Robert S. Tragesser, Phenomenology and Logic (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, 1977).
95 “The Source of Goodness”, forthcoming. A shorter version of the argument is to 
be found in Why Believe?, (Continuum Press, London, 2009), ch 2. 
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We may not have reached the stage where we can say with confidence 
that atheism is impossible, but we can surely allow that the possibilities 
remain open, and that the first step towards progress is to be as clear as 
we can about the nature of the relevant disagreements. I hope to have 
shown that one seemingly massive disagreement is really just a matter 
of semantics.96
96 Thanks to Mike Inwood, Edward Kanterian, John McDade, Gemma Simmonds, 
and Zita Zigan for inspiration and encouragement. 
